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Bris tol ,  BSB IUB, UK 
ABSTRACT 
We propose the use of robust watermarks to enable the char- 
acterisation of attacks even after lossy compression, such as 
IPEG and IPEG2000. A prcviously constructed Bayesian 
framework is used to allow characterisation of attacks from 
a predetermined library, and the double watermarking tech- 
” nique as earlier proposed by the authors is employed to gen- 
erate the features used to drive the classifier. The results 
show that the developped techniques perform well for both 
types of compression. 
INTRODUCTION 
With the proliferation of powerful home computers, the use 
of digital media is ever increasing. In addition to the copy- 
right issues this raises. of equal importance is that of the 
authentication of said media. Perhaps the most palpable use 
is that of evidence authentication, for example in a court 
of law. There are a plethora of additional uses, however. 
Consider the case of a photographic agcncy: a paper will 
not intentionally download and publish an image they know 
to have been altered. hut what is to stop the photographer 
tampering with the image to improve its commercial poten- 
tial? There are many systems that provide authentication of 
uncompressed images [I ,  2, 31. However, it IS frequently 
impractical to download and store say a 5 megapixel image, 
and thus compression is often used. We therefore propose a 
system that is capable of determining which of a library of 
attacks has occurred, and can operate on images compressed 
using either IPEG or JPEGZOOO. 
DOUBLE WATERMARKING 
In order to be able to characterise the attack that has taken 
place, it is self-evident that some part of the watermark must 
remain after the auack. Indeed, in order that a wide variety 
of attacks with ranging severity are to he classifiable. it is 
desirahle that the watermark will degrade relatively slowly, 
and have some presence even after the most severe of at- 
tacks. For this reason a robust watermark i s  embedded with 
a masking function to ensure the maximum possible water- 
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mark energy is inserted, without the watermark becoming 
visible. 
We build on our earlier work in [4] and use the dou- 
ble watermarking process described therein. The Bayesian 
framework constructed in [SI is used to enable characten- 
sation of the attacks to take place. The data may he mod- 
elled as either normal [6 ]  or skcw-normal (SN) [7]. There 
are a number of reasons for choosing a parametric model. 
Firstly. parametric techniques do not suffer from sparsity 
issues in the same way that non-parametric techniques do, 
nor do they require large multi-dimensional histograms to 
he stored, a potentially inhibitive feature for example for 
image authentication for police officers in the field. The fi- 
nal desirable property of the Gaussian distribution is that 
evaluation of the full density function is not necessary, thus 
computational requirements are reduced. We extend exist- 
ing work to consider the case where the images have been 
compressed using lossless compression, and compare two 
such Systems - JPEG and JPEG2000. 
T H E  SKEW NORMAL DISTRIBUTION 
The SN distrihution is descrihed in detail in [71. The advan- 
tage of the skew-normal over the normal distribution from 
a classification perspective is that it has an extra degree of 
freedom, thus potentially enabling more accurate fitting of 
the data to the model. Examples of how a, the skew paran- 
eter, affects the distribution an given in Figure 1 
Fig. 1. Variations in Skew-Normal density with skew (a) 
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RESULTS 
The images were first watermarked, compressed and then 
attacked. After the training process, which in this case in- 
volves estimating the mean and the covariance matrix (& 
skew for the SN distribution), the performance of the clas- 
sifier was evaluated. The first set ofexperiments used JPEG 
compression with a Quality Factor of 95. whilst the sec- 
ond used JPEG2000 compression with a compression ratio 
of 5:l .  Both types of compression yield similar PSNR for 
Lena. 
For the Gaussian classifier, previous experiments on un- 
compressed images gave an overall misclassification rate of 
5.7% [6] e.g. averaged over all attacks, 5.7% af the time 
the classifier produces an erroneous decision. For JPEG. 
the error rate dropped to 5.0%. whilst for the JPEGZOOO 
case i t  increased only slightly to 7.4%. For the SN classi- 
fier, the uncompressed error rate is 4.3%. which also drops 
for the JPEG compressed case, this time to 3.2%. It rises 
to 6.4% in the case where JPEG2000 compression has been 
applied. Therefore clearly the SN classifier outperforms the 
Gaussian classifier, as would be expectedon account of the 
closer f i t  of the model 10 the data afforded by the skew term. 
Results in Figure 2 give some preliminary results show- 
ing haw the system is able to localise attacks. By comparing 
Figures 2(a) and 2(b) we can see that the averaging attack is 
correctly identified. The location to which an unshaq mask 
has been applied is also correctly identified (Figure 2(c)). 
However, there are some areas where false positives occur 
(see Figure 2(d)). By comparison with Figure 2(a), it can 
be seen that these errors occur in textured and edge regions. 
which have an increased similvxity with regions which have 
been unsharp masked. It is hoped that future work will re- 
duce this percentage of false positives. 
Further discussion as to the cause of the change in error 
rates will be presented, along with consideration as to why 
differing regions have different probabilities of misclassifi- 
cation and potential solutions. We also include a study ex- 
amining how the assumed Gaussianitylskew-normality dif- 
fers from the true data, and discuss how this will affect the 
performance of the system. We also consider methods for 
reducing these discrepancies. 
CONCLUSIONS 
In the proposed paper we show that by using a double water- 
marking strategy, characterisation andlocalisation of any at- 
tack from a predetermined attack is possible even after com- 
pression with low probabilities of misclassification. The 
improved fit between the data and the model for the skew- 
normal distribution yields a lower misclassification rate than 
for the Gaussian case, with the trade-off of increased com- 
putational complexity. 
(C) (4 
Fig. 2. (a) Lena after attack. Areas (white) for Normal 
classifier where (b) averaging with 5-by-5 filter, (c) unsharp 
mask, and (d) nothing, are the MAP estimate of the attack 
that has taken place. IPEG compression (QF=95) precedes 
the attack. 
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